Interpretative Conventions as a Way of Horizontal Control of Judicial Decision

Keywords: Judicial Decision, Horizontal Control, Interpretative Conventions, Correctness Criteria, Razones para la acción

Abstract

In this work I intend to connect the philosophical discussion on the judicial practice of identifying the Law with the problem of how to control judicial activity. By control of judicial activity, I mean the verification of the legal correctness of the decisions on the existence and content of the Law taken by judges in their sentences. I will try to show that, in addition to forms of vertical control, there is the possibility of a type of horizontal control stemming from the conventional structure of judges’ collective action. The text will deal with two main issues: the elements of the conventional structure and how it may be able to control judicial activity.

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Published
2021-09-01
How to Cite
Arena, F. (2021). Interpretative Conventions as a Way of Horizontal Control of Judicial Decision. Omnia Journal, 4(4), 11-25. https://doi.org/10.53794/ro.v4i4.333